Qualitative analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.11.030zbMath1231.91125OpenAlexW2019000031MaRDI QIDQ531405

Juan Momparler, Pablo Gregori

Publication date: 29 April 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.030

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric gameauctionphase plane

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
• First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
• Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.

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