Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.024zbMath1210.91031OpenAlexW1967466550MaRDI QIDQ531422

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date: 29 April 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.024

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityneutralityanonymitysocial choice function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

Collective identity functions with status quo ⋮ The sufficient and necessary condition of the major stochastic preference rule in group decision making ⋮ Anonymous and neutral majority rules ⋮ Symmetric majority rules ⋮ Anonymous and positively responsive aggregation rules ⋮ Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences ⋮ Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour ⋮ Breaking ties in collective decision-making

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A simple characterization of majority rule
• Another characterization of the majority rule.
• A new characterization of the majority rule
• A complete characterization of majority rules
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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