WHEN TO RATIFY AN ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT: THE CASE OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES

DOI10.1142/S0219198904000071zbMath1181.91249OpenAlexW2004947293MaRDI QIDQ5315562

Marko Lindroos, Veijo Kaitala

Publication date: 8 September 2005

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198904000071

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamesfisheriesinternational environmental agreementscooperative agreementsratification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites Work

• Equilibria in a stochastic resource management game under imperfect information

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