Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete

DOI10.1007/3-540-26979-7_21zbMath1105.91043OpenAlexW2035532500MaRDI QIDQ5316204

Stefan Krasa, Wayne J. Shafer

Publication date: 12 September 2005

Published in: Studies in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-26979-7_21

zbMATH Keywords

differential information,

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• On income taxation and the core
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information
• The core of an economy with differential information
• Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
• Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's \(M\)-form firm
• A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies
• Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
• Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information

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