Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection
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Publication:5316206
DOI10.1007/3-540-26979-7_23zbMath1105.91038OpenAlexW2030932270MaRDI QIDQ5316206
Publication date: 12 September 2005
Published in: Studies in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-26979-7_23
Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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