Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?

DOI10.1007/3-540-26979-7_29zbMath1105.91044OpenAlexW4248291109MaRDI QIDQ5316212

Nicholas C. Yannelis, Akram Temimi, Stefan Krasa

Publication date: 12 September 2005

Published in: Studies in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-26979-7_29

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuebargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

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• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information
• Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information
• Private value allocations in large economies with differential information
• Differential information economies: Introduction
• An extensive form interpretation of the private core

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