A CLASS OF GAMES WITH COUPLED CONSTRAINTS TO MODEL INTERNATIONAL GHG EMISSION AGREEMENTS

DOI10.1142/S0219198908001984zbMath1178.91143OpenAlexW2110214742MaRDI QIDQ5324555

Olivier Bahn, Alain B. Haurie

Publication date: 3 August 2009

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908001984

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesPareto optimalitygreenhouse gasmulti-region economic model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (6)

A cost-effectiveness differential game model for climate agreements ⋮ An OLG Differential Game of Pollution Control with the Risk of a Catastrophic Climate Change ⋮ Combining Adaptation and Mitigation: A Game Theoretic Approach ⋮ Reaching Paris agreement goal through carbon dioxide removal development: a compact OR model ⋮ A robust meta-game for climate negotiations ⋮ A Steady-State Game of a Net-Zero Emission Climate Regime

Cites Work

• ETSAP-TIAM: the TIMES integrated assessment model. II: Mathematical formulation
• An oracle based method to compute a coupled equilibrium in a model of international climate policy
• A stochastic control model for optimal timing of climate policies
• A two-level computable equilibrium model to assess the strategic allocation of emission allowances within the European Union
• The Bargaining Problem
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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