DYNAMICALLY CONSISTENT SOLUTION FOR A POLLUTION MANAGEMENT GAME IN COLLABORATIVE ABATEMENT WITH UNCERTAIN FUTURE PAYOFFS

DOI10.1142/S0219198908002072zbMath1178.91146OpenAlexW1977113389MaRDI QIDQ5324564

David W. K. Yeung

Publication date: 3 August 2009

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908002072

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative differential gamessubgame consistencypollution abatementuncertain future payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (3)

Dynamically consistent collaborative environmental management with production technique choices ⋮ Collaborative environmental management for transboundary air pollution problems: a differential levies game ⋮ A Cooperative Dynamic Environmental Game of Subgame Consistent Clean Technology Development

Cites Work

• A differential game of industrial pollution management
• Subgame consistent cooperative solutions in stochastic differential games
• International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
• Slowing deforestation pace through subsidies: A differential game.
• Capital accumulation subject to pollution control: Open-loop versus feedback investment strategies
• Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
• Subgame-consistent cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic differential games
• Subgame consistent solutions of a cooperative stochastic differential game with nontransferable payoffs
• A game-theoretic formulation of joint implementation of environmental projects
• A differential game of joint implementation of environmental projects
• Dynamically stable corporate joint ventures
• Non-cooperative games
• Optimal pricing of a monopoly against a competitive producer
• Cooperative Stochastic Differential Games
• Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution
• Infinite-horizon stochastic differential games with branching payoffs.
• Environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies.

This page was built for publication: DYNAMICALLY CONSISTENT SOLUTION FOR A POLLUTION MANAGEMENT GAME IN COLLABORATIVE ABATEMENT WITH UNCERTAIN FUTURE PAYOFFS