THE AGENCIES METHOD FOR MODELING COALITIONS AND COOPERATION IN GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198908002084zbMath1178.91019OpenAlexW2066050516MaRDI QIDQ5324565

John F. jun. Nash

Publication date: 3 August 2009

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908002084

zbMATH Keywords

experimentbargainingprisoner's dilemmacoalitional gamespro-cooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification ⋮ Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Values of games in partition function form
• Endogeneous formation of coalitions in noncooperative games
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• Non-cooperative games
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• A Comparison of Treatments of a Duopoly Situation

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