Decentralized job matching
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Publication:532508
DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0218-xzbMath1216.91017OpenAlexW2108738437MaRDI QIDQ532508
Guillaume Haeringer, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269572/files/twerp688.pdf
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Cites Work
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- Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
