Aggregate information, common knowledge and agreeing not to bet

DOI10.1007/S00182-010-0226-XzbMath1274.91086OpenAlexW2064099895MaRDI QIDQ532512

Elias Tsakas

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0226-x

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgegambleslimited participation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Cites Work

• Information, trade and common knowledge
• We can't disagree forever
• Agreeing to disagree
• Consensus by identifying extremists
• Disagreement is unpredictable.
• Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
• Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Expectations
• Common Knowledge of a Multivariate Aggregate Statistic

This page was built for publication: Aggregate information, common knowledge and agreeing not to bet