Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation

DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0140-7zbMath1211.91080OpenAlexW3125241557MaRDI QIDQ532650

Rahmi İlkılıç, Antoni Calvó-Armengol

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0140-7

zbMATH Keywords

network formationproper equilibriumpairwise-stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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