On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1007/S00182-008-0149-YzbMath1211.91016OpenAlexW2152823865MaRDI QIDQ532656

Myrna Holtz Wooders, Edward J. P. Cartwright

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269595/files/twerp701.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian equilibriumpurificationexpost Nashsemi-anonymous games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (3)

Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players ⋮ On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players ⋮ Purification of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in large games with compact type and action spaces

Cites Work

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• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
• Large Robust Games

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