On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players
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Publication:532657
DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0150-5zbMath1211.91161OpenAlexW3123706648MaRDI QIDQ532657
Myrna Holtz Wooders, Edward J. P. Cartwright
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269570/files/twerp686b.pdf
large gamesBayesian equilibriumShapley-Folkman theorempurificationcountable strategy spaceex-post stabilitysemi-anonymity
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