Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way

DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0144-3zbMath1211.91131OpenAlexW2045121063MaRDI QIDQ532664

Yves Breitmoser

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0144-3

zbMATH Keywords

non-cooperativedemand bargainingmajority decisions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria

Cites Work

• The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
• Bargaining and strategic demand commitment
• Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
• Bargaining with commitments
• On implementation via demand commitment games
• Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems
• Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers

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