On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information

DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0146-1zbMath1211.91014OpenAlexW2013176681MaRDI QIDQ532667

Yaron Azrieli

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0146-1

zbMATH Keywords

pure strategy equilibriumconjectural equilibriumnon-manipulable information structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (4)

Belief distorted Nash equilibria: introduction of a new kind of equilibrium in dynamic games with distorted information ⋮ Redefinition of belief distorted Nash equilibria for the environment of dynamic games with probabilistic beliefs ⋮ Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games ⋮ Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium

Cites Work

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• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
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• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
• Large Robust Games

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