Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space
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Publication:532668
DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0148-zzbMath1211.91010OpenAlexW1978080183MaRDI QIDQ532668
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0148-z
2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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Cooperation and evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game with institutional incentives ⋮ CSS, NIS and dynamic stability for two-species behavioral models with continuous trait spaces ⋮ Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games ⋮ Evolutionary stability in first price auctions ⋮ Political institutions and the evolution of character traits ⋮ Evolutionarily stable strategy and invader strategy in matrix games ⋮ Globally Strong Uninvadable Sets of Profiles in Asymmetric Games ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics on measurable strategy spaces: asymmetric games ⋮ The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law ⋮ Evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
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