Noncooperative farsighted stable set in an \(n\)-player prisoners' dilemma
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Publication:532670
DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0152-yzbMath1211.91062OpenAlexW2095736468MaRDI QIDQ532670
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0152-y
prisoners' dilemmavon Neumann-Morgenstern stable setfarsighted stabilitytheory of social situations (TOSS)
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- Farsighted stability in an \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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