An NTU value under complement reduced game

DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0155-8zbMath1211.91038OpenAlexW1975351529MaRDI QIDQ532674

Yan-An Hwang

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0155-8

zbMATH Keywords

complement reduced gameNTU value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Consistency and dynamic approach of indexes

Cites Work

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• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• A Note on Wallis' Bounds Test and Negative Autocorrelation
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game

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