Credible deviations from signaling equilibria

DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0161-xzbMath1211.91074OpenAlexW2120779234MaRDI QIDQ532686

James Schummer, Péter Eső

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:d1128352-abe5-42af-955c-ec16e9494209

zbMATH Keywords

signaling gamesrefinementsrobust equilibriumsender-receiver

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (3)

Job market signaling and employer learning ⋮ Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games ⋮ Verifiable disclosure

Cites Work

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• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Cheap talk and burned money
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Informational Equilibrium
• Strategic Information Transmission
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium

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