Strategy-proof coalition formation

DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0162-9zbMath1211.91047OpenAlexW2041650715MaRDI QIDQ532687

Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.centrodeestudiosandaluces.info/PDFS/E200611.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesscoalition formationcore-stabilitysingle-lapping property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (9)

Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities ⋮ Manipulability in a group activity selection problem ⋮ Coalition formation problems with externalities ⋮ Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems ⋮ Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange ⋮ Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited ⋮ Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size ⋮ Strategyproof mechanisms for friends and enemies games ⋮ Strategyproof Mechanisms for Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games

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• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange

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