Strategy-proof coalition formation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:532687
DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0162-9zbMath1211.91047OpenAlexW2041650715MaRDI QIDQ532687
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.centrodeestudiosandaluces.info/PDFS/E200611.pdf
Related Items (9)
Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities ⋮ Manipulability in a group activity selection problem ⋮ Coalition formation problems with externalities ⋮ Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems ⋮ Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange ⋮ Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited ⋮ Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size ⋮ Strategyproof mechanisms for friends and enemies games ⋮ Strategyproof Mechanisms for Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
- Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
- The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.
- Stability in coalition formation games
- A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games
- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games
- On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: a converse result
- Voting by Committees
- Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Incentive Compatible Behavior in Core-Selecting Organizations
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
This page was built for publication: Strategy-proof coalition formation
