Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
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Publication:532688
DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0163-8zbMath1211.91178OpenAlexW2067584386MaRDI QIDQ532688
Takashi Hayashi, Toyotaka Sakai
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0163-8
mechanism designNash implementationindivisible goodsmany-to-one matchingjob-matchingmonotonic extension
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