Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing

DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0192-3zbMath1211.91120OpenAlexW1982742273MaRDI QIDQ532731

Tae Kun Seo, Rajat K. Deb

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0192-3

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofcost sharingpublic goodquota rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
• Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
• Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good

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