Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games

DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0206-1zbMath1211.91182OpenAlexW1990955687MaRDI QIDQ532732

Marilda Sotomayor

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0206-1

zbMATH Keywords

core allocationstable allocationdual allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept

Cites Work

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