Large auctions with risk-averse bidders

DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0181-6zbMath1211.91134OpenAlexW2003354343MaRDI QIDQ532743

Arieh Gavious, Gadi Fibich

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0181-6

zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic analysisrisk aversionequilibrium strategyrevenue equivalencelarge auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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