When queueing is better than push and shove
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Publication:532746
DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0198-xzbMath1211.90050OpenAlexW3122397081MaRDI QIDQ532746
Alex Gershkov, Paul Schweinzer
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13407/1/144.pdf
Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Stochastic scheduling theory in operations research (90B36)
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