The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games
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Publication:532747
DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0219-9zbMath1211.91065OpenAlexW2164169468MaRDI QIDQ532747
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0219-9
Related Items (8)
Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting ⋮ Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games ⋮ The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Time-Dependent Discounting ⋮ On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting ⋮ Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences ⋮ On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games ⋮ Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames ⋮ FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN DISCOUNTED SUPERGAMES
Cites Work
- The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
- Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors
- Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?
- Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- On Repeated Games with Complete Information
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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