Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity

DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0188-zzbMath1211.91139OpenAlexW1996112520MaRDI QIDQ532751

Laurent Lamy

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0188-z

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscorecore-selecting auctionscombinatorial biddingpackage bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods ⋮ On core-selecting and core-competitive mechanisms for binary single-parameter auctions ⋮ Core deviation minimizing auctions ⋮ Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions

Cites Work

• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• The package assignment model.
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence

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