Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo

DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0202-5zbMath1211.91136OpenAlexW2073753248MaRDI QIDQ532760

Tasos Kalandrakis

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0202-5

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingendogenous status quodictatorial agenda settingproposal power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (15)

Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players ⋮ The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power ⋮ Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic? ⋮ Fully absorbing dynamic compromise ⋮ BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH ⋮ Dynamic legislative policy making ⋮ Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions ⋮ Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments ⋮ Divide the dollar and conquer more: sequential bargaining and risk aversion ⋮ A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games ⋮ LEGISLATED PROTECTION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ⋮ On dynamic compromise ⋮ Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players ⋮ Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power ⋮ Bilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo

Cites Work

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• Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
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• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions

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