Extendability and von neuman-morgenstern stability of the core

DOI10.1007/s00182-010-0223-0zbMath1211.91039OpenAlexW2086375705MaRDI QIDQ532769

Yong-Cai Geng, Sumit K. Garg

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0223-0

zbMATH Keywords

corestable setsco-operative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (3)

Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core ⋮ An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games ⋮ Stable cores in information graph games

Cites Work

• Cooperative games with large cores
• Prosperty properties of TU-games
• Large cores and exactness
• Cores of convex games
• Cores of exact games. I
• Fourier's Method of Linear Programming and Its Dual
• A game with no solution
• Stability and largeness of the core
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

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