Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.018zbMath1282.91235OpenAlexW2089537431MaRDI QIDQ533096

Özgür Yılmaz

Publication date: 2 May 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://cdm21054.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/IR/id/6247

zbMATH Keywords

matchingmechanism designLorenz dominancerandom assignmentkidney exchange

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (8)

A one-sided many-to-many matching problem ⋮ Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences ⋮ Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange ⋮ Kidney exchange: further utilization of donors via listed exchange ⋮ Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange ⋮ On the operation of multiple matching markets ⋮ Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange ⋮ Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
• Random assignment under weak preferences
• House allocation with existing tenants
• On cores and indivisibility
• Combinatorial optimization. Polyhedra and efficiency (3 volumes)
• House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
• Kidney Exchange
• Dynamic Kidney Exchange
• A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• On Representatives of Subsets
• Paths, Trees, and Flowers
• Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences

This page was built for publication: Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism