Median stable matching for markets with wages

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.004zbMath1282.91234OpenAlexW3125015338MaRDI QIDQ533097

Michael Schwarz, M. Bumin Yenmez

Publication date: 2 May 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

labor marketcoremarket designassignment game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Improving the Chilean College Admissions System, Median stable matchings in two-sided markets, Paths to stability in the assignment problem, Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets, Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions, Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians, Stability and median rationalizability for aggregate matchings, Quantile stable mechanisms, Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains

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