The genericity of beliefs-determine-preferences models revisited

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.005zbMath1282.91124OpenAlexW2015188287MaRDI QIDQ533106

Yi-Chun Chen, Siyang Xiong

Publication date: 2 May 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.005

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designbeliefs-determine-preferences priorscommon priorsfull surplus extraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces ⋮ Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge ⋮ Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs ⋮ Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces

Cites Work

• On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Attractors of iterated function systems and Markov operators
• Real Analysis and Probability
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design

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