Extending the notion of rationality of selfish agents: second order Nash equilibria
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Publication:533871
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2011.01.008zbMath1211.91015OpenAlexW2131042067MaRDI QIDQ533871
Vittorio Bilò, Michele Flammini
Publication date: 10 May 2011
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2011.01.008
Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Related Items (3)
Perfect prediction in normal form: superrational thinking extended to non-symmetric games ⋮ Some anomalies of farsighted strategic behavior ⋮ On the sequential price of anarchy of isolation games
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