Extending the notion of rationality of selfish agents: second order Nash equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2011.01.008zbMath1211.91015OpenAlexW2131042067MaRDI QIDQ533871

Vittorio Bilò, Michele Flammini

Publication date: 10 May 2011

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2011.01.008

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaalgorithmic game theoryrational behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (3)

Perfect prediction in normal form: superrational thinking extended to non-symmetric games ⋮ Some anomalies of farsighted strategic behavior ⋮ On the sequential price of anarchy of isolation games

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