Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.10.005zbMath1211.91060OpenAlexW2170266066MaRDI QIDQ533902

Tristan Tomala, Pauline Contou-Carrère

Publication date: 10 May 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00524134/file/10073.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

folk theoremfinitely repeated gamessemi-standard monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoring

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