The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.002zbMath1211.91030OpenAlexW1968450383MaRDI QIDQ533914

Onur Doğan, Gilbert Laffond, Lainé, Jean

Publication date: 10 May 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

corecouplesindivisible goodsjoint preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Trade models (91B60)

Related Items (4)

Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities ⋮ Allocating group housing ⋮ Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf ⋮ Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• On cores and indivisibility
• Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods

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