Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2010.12.004zbMath1211.91132OpenAlexW1974665451MaRDI QIDQ533941

Harrison H. C. Cheng

Publication date: 10 May 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetryfirst-price auctionsprivate valuerevenue effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Ranking asymmetric auctions ⋮ Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations

Cites Work

• Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
• Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence.
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions

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