Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.05.026zbMath1211.91144OpenAlexW2028520635MaRDI QIDQ533950

Yiqing Xing, Xu Tan

Publication date: 10 May 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.026

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetryresalesecond-price auctionmonotone equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Asymmetric wheat auctions with resale and partially divisible bidding objects

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions

This page was built for publication: Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders