The Price of Anarchy in Auctions

DOI10.1613/jair.5272zbMath1417.91250arXiv1607.07684OpenAlexW2511754421MaRDI QIDQ5346024

Éva Tardos, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Tim Roughgarden

Publication date: 8 June 2017

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.07684

zbMATH Keywords

learningauctionsprice of anarchysmoothness-type inequalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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