IMPERFECTLY INFORMED VOTERS AND STRATEGIC EXTREMISM

DOI10.1111/IERE.12223zbMath1403.91128OpenAlexW2143958676MaRDI QIDQ5350502

Enriqueta Aragonès, Dimitrios Xefteris

Publication date: 1 September 2017

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.685.8755

zbMATH Keywords

imperfectly informed votersstrategic extremisimtwo-candidate Downsian model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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