A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels
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Publication:535169
DOI10.1007/S00199-010-0524-3zbMath1213.91078OpenAlexW2090478411MaRDI QIDQ535169
Nicolas Sahuguet, Johannes Hörner
Publication date: 11 May 2011
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0524-3
2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items (8)
Surplus dissipating equilibria in the dollar auction ⋮ War of attrition with incomplete information and fuzzy players' types ⋮ Evolutionary games with sequential decisions and dollar auctions ⋮ One-sided games in a war of attrition ⋮ Resource inequality in the war of attrition ⋮ Trilateral escalation in the dollar auction ⋮ Equilibrium in a war of attrition with an option to fight decisively ⋮ Wars of attrition with endogenously determined budget constraints
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