Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames
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Publication:535171
DOI10.1007/S00199-010-0527-0zbMath1229.91067OpenAlexW2171354870MaRDI QIDQ535171
Emmanuel Dechenaux, Dan Kovenock
Publication date: 11 May 2011
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0527-0
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Dynamic games (91A25) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (4)
A Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly with a public firm ⋮ Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry ⋮ Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames ⋮ Dynamic Pricing of Peak Production
Cites Work
- Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames
- Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
- Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames
- Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach
- Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints
- Excess Capacity and Collusion
- Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and Quantities
- Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity
- Price Leadership
- Endogenous Rationing in a Differentiated Product Duopoly
- Price Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
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