On myopia as rationale for social security

DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0528-zzbMath1213.91105OpenAlexW1980112044MaRDI QIDQ535173

Joydeep Bhattacharya, Torben M. Andersen

Publication date: 11 May 2011

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/p1762-2008-08-29.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

pensionssocial securitymyopiadynamic efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic dynamics (91B55) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (7)

Optimal education policies under endogenous borrowing constraints ⋮ The political intergenerational welfare state ⋮ The macroeconomic implications of deficit financing under present bias ⋮ Commitment and partial naïveté: early withdrawal penalties on retirement accounts ⋮ Time-inconsistent preferences and time-inconsistent policies ⋮ UNFUNDED PENSIONS AND ENDOGENOUS LABOR SUPPLY ⋮ Why mandate young borrowers to contribute to their retirement accounts?

Cites Work

• Existence of steady-state equilibrium in an overlapping-generations model with production
• A theory of reference-dependent behavior
• Optimum Social Security in a Life-Cycle Growth Model
• UNFUNDED PENSIONS AND ENDOGENOUS LABOR SUPPLY

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