The chairman's paradox revisited
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Publication:535264
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0163-6zbMath1211.91099OpenAlexW2159442761MaRDI QIDQ535264
Matthew Braham, Frank Daniel Steffen
Publication date: 11 May 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0163-6
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