Selfish Response to Epidemic Propagation

DOI10.1109/TAC.2012.2209949zbMath1369.93451arXiv1010.0609OpenAlexW2152980518MaRDI QIDQ5353110

George Theodorakopoulos, Jean-Yves Le Boudec, John S. Baras

Publication date: 8 September 2017

Published in: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1010.0609

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Lyapunov and other classical stabilities (Lagrange, Poisson, (L^p, l^p), etc.) in control theory (93D05) Ordinary differential inclusions (34A60) Attractors of solutions to ordinary differential equations (34D45)

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Game-theoretic frameworks for epidemic spreading and human decision-making: a review ⋮ Dynamic games of social distancing during an epidemic: analysis of asymmetric solutions ⋮ Nash social distancing games with equity constraints: how inequality aversion affects the spread of epidemics ⋮ Learning to mitigate epidemic risks: a dynamic population game approach ⋮ Convergence of linear threshold decision-making dynamics in finite heterogeneous populations ⋮ An efficient dynamic allocation mechanism for security in networks of interdependent strategic agents ⋮ Impacts of Game-Theoretic Activation on Epidemic Spread over Dynamical Networks

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