Reapproaching Ramsey: conditionals and iterated belief change in the spirit of AGM
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Publication:535330
DOI10.1007/s10992-011-9177-3zbMath1233.03015OpenAlexW2062015890MaRDI QIDQ535330
Publication date: 11 May 2011
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9177-3
Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Probability and inductive logic (03B48)
Related Items (11)
DIFFERENCE-MAKING CONDITIONALS AND THE RELEVANT RAMSEY TEST ⋮ The irreducibility of iterated to single revision ⋮ Difference-making conditionals and connexivity ⋮ AN EXPRESSIVIST ANALYSIS OF THE INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL WITH A RESTRICTOR SEMANTICS ⋮ A concept for the evolution of relational probabilistic belief states and the computation of their changes under optimum entropy semantics ⋮ Interpreting enthymematic arguments using belief revision ⋮ Lewis' triviality for quasi probabilities ⋮ On the Ramsey test analysis of `because' ⋮ Defeasible normative reasoning ⋮ Four ways in which theories of belief revision could benefit from theories of epistemic justification ⋮ A simple and non-trivial Ramsey test
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