Is abstention an escape from Arrow's theorem?

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0180-5zbMath1213.91060OpenAlexW1966424270MaRDI QIDQ535402

Murat Ali Çengelci, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date: 11 May 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0180-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions

Cites Work

• Another characterization of the majority rule.
• A new characterization of the majority rule
• Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies
• More on the majority rule: profiles, societies, and responsiveness
• Abstention as an escape from arrow's theorem

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