Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty
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Publication:535404
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0182-3zbMath1211.91104OpenAlexW2001380026MaRDI QIDQ535404
Publication date: 11 May 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0182-3
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