Monotonicity in Condorcet's jury theorem with dependent voters
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Publication:535406
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0179-yzbMath1211.91098OpenAlexW1991215763MaRDI QIDQ535406
Publication date: 11 May 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0179-y
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