Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes
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Publication:536079
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.001zbMath1236.91059OpenAlexW2154192270WikidataQ56873874 ScholiaQ56873874MaRDI QIDQ536079
Publication date: 16 May 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.001
Voting theory (91B12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)
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Cites Work
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- How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games
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